characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. -- Coalitions … ; Core ; Stability ; Status-seeking …

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more … payoffs at each date according to the coalition structure prevailing at the time. We use this model to nest two broad … approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties …

coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in …

property which induces a rich domain on players's preferences in hedonic games, and guarantees the existence of core stable … partitions. We strengthen this observation by proving the existence of strict core stable partitions, and when a mutuality … condition is imposed as well, the existence of Nash stable partitions. -- Coalition formation ; Nash stability ; Partitions …

increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement … equilibrium in pure stationary strategies whose limiting outcome as players get more patient is the core-constrained Nash … Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings …

domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents' preferences, we …

weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …