coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions … would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

-- imputations belonging to the core -- is, while almost as well known, an overly complex, NP-hard problem, even for modern … supercomputers. The issue becomes uncertain because, among other issues, it is unknown whether the core is non-empty. In the proposed … cooperative game, under the name of singles, the presence of non-empty collections of outcomes (payoffs) similar to the core (say …

In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, we propose new core notions in the …-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property rights. Our first notion lies between the strong core and the weak core … and is independent of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's (2019a) exclusion core. Our second notion refines the first and the …