Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003744636
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003356112
For sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009688488
For sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702215
For sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246011
The regulation of environmental externalities at the global level requires international agreements between sovereign states. Game theory provides an appropriate theoretical tool for analysis. However, game theory can result in a wide range of outcomes, and therefore it is important to discuss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013013992
In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066210