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Three-valued simple games

Musegaas, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350040

Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities

Tripathi, Rajeev R.; Amit, R. K. - In: Operations research letters 44 (2016) 2, pp. 219-224

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457329

The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games

Yang, Guangjing; Sun, Hao - In: Journal of mathematical economics 104 (2023), pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014231298

Multiplayer allocations in the presence of diminishing marginal contributions : cooperative game analysis and applications in management science

Leng, Mingming; Luo, Chunlin; Liang, Liping - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 67 (2021) 5, pp. 2891-2903

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550050

Prosperity Properties of Tu-Games

van Gellekom, J. R. G.; Potters, Jos A. M.; Reijnierse, Hans - 1999

An important open problem in the theory of TU-games is to determine whether a game has a stable core (Von Neumann …-Morgenstern solution (1944)). This seems to be a rather difficult combinatorial problem. There are many sufficient conditions for core …-stability. Convexity is probably the best known of these properties. Other properties implying stability of the core are subconvexity and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192724

Coalition formation and stability

Magaña, Antonio; Carreras, Francesc - In: Group decision and negotiation 27 (2018) 3, pp. 467-502

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011859566

Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021

In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550309

Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494898

Decomposition and representation of coalitional games

Marinacci, Massimo - 1995 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000938577

Coalition structure values in differential information economies:is unity a strength?

Krasa, Stefan; Temimi, Akram; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - In: Differential information economies, (pp. 553-565). 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003049177