provision of public goods and with it the welfare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard … Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson tax-competition model this paper analyses the conditions under which tax coordination by a group of … countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the …

provision of public goods and with it the wel- fare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard … Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson tax-competition model this paper analyses the con- ditions under which tax coordination by a group … of countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset …

particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions … means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the … coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as …

particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions … means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the … coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as …

messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …