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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003706894
-player global games with asymmetric information. Before making any decision, a subject sends the other player in the same group a …This study experimentally investigates the role of two-sided cheap talk in decisions under asymmetric information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849211
We study experimentally how the network structure and length of pre-play communication affect behavior and outcome in a multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network and time effects is more subtle. Under each time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200671
from the previous players to fathom the past. Each player is therefore both a receiver of information with respect to his … makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria - ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220427
an information item that he is the only player to hold. Players are offered a ?nite number of periods to centralize the … offered an additional reward that he keeps for himself. In this framework where information transmission is strategic and … physically restricted, we provide a necessary and suffcient condition for a group to pool information items in every equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334059
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275033
information transmission is possible with unmediated communication. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281512
information item that he is the only player to hold. Players are offered a finite number of periods to centralize the initially … additional reward that he keeps for himself. In this framework where information transmission is strategic and physically … restricted, we provide a necessary and suffcient condition for a group to pool information items in every equilibrium. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950474
precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central … bank should disclose or not its information, but how the central bank should disclose it. We consider a static coordination … game in which the private sector receives n semi-public information plus their specific information, and we analyse the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526649
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012721096