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This paper studies a model of strategic communication by an informed and upwardly biased sender to one or more receivers. Applications include situations in which (i) it is costly for the sender to misrepresent information, due to legal, technological, or moral constraints, or (ii) receivers may...
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Misrepresenting private information is often costly. This paper studies a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982)(CS), but with a signaling dimension where there is a convex cost of misreporting. I identify a simple condition, called No Incentive to...
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Austen-Smith and Banks (Journal of Economic Theory, 2000) study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica, 1982). This note identifies an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provides a variant that preserves some...
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