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Strategic Diffusion in Communication Networks
Chakrabarti, Shomak - 2019
I study information diffusion in a social network where a third party can control the precision of information as well … each other through links in a social network. The designer relies on this word-of-mouth communication channel to diffuse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870478
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Who Do You Want to Talk to? Theory and Experiment of Network Formation under Strategic Information Transmission
Meng, Delong; Wang, Siyu - 2022
We combine network formation and information transmission in a simple model and predict that people reveal less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079960
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Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295
We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately … their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic … dominate farsighted equilibria, in particular if a social planner has designed the network optimally. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319
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Communication and Information Aggregation for Tricky Questions
Nagaoka, Naruto - 2020
We consider common-value voting when a variable that is independent of the payoff-relevant state determines the meaning and precision of voters' private signals about the payoff-relevant state. Multiple senders sharing the same objective as the voters receive noisy signals that are contingent on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841494
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Organized Information Transmission
Mathevet, Laurent - 2020
In reality, the organizational structure of information — describing how information is transmitted to its recipients — is as important as its content. In this paper, we introduce families of (indirect) information structures, namely meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that capture...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827824
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Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Meyer, Margaret A.; Moreno de Barreda, Inés; Nafziger, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1203-1235
This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158784
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Smooth, strategic communication : conference paper
Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezső - 2014
We study strategic communication between a Sender and Receiver who are both uncertain about their preferred actions. The Sender observes noisy signals about both players' ideal policies and then communicates with the Receiver. Even though Sender and Receiver disagree about ideal policies as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482440
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Strategic abuse and accuser credibility
Di Pei, Harry; Strulovici, Bruno - 2018
We study the interaction between a potential offender's (principal ) incentive to commit crimes and the potential victims' (agents) incentive to report crime. The probability of crime and the credibility of reports are endogenously determined in equilibrium, and the principal is convicted if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011923220
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Strategic communication : an experimental investigation
Eckartz, Katharina Marie; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014
In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
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Attention manipulation and information overload
Persson, Petra - 2013
When a decision-maker's attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker's attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222954