This paper considers a simple model of zero-sum conflict between two players (e.g., territorial dispute) in which … costly actions (e.g., terrorism) are available to one side. We identify how reputation effects shape the outcome of such … conflict. A small prior of fanatic commitment type induces the possibility of costly attack followed by withdrawal in …

We model simultaneous inter and within identity-group conflict in two territories connected by cross-territorial spill … higher efficiency of a group in inter-group conflict. We find that inter-group and total conflict move together within a … territory, while within-group conflict and output move in the opposite direction. A unilateral increase in cross-border spill …

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric … players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields …

advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll …

Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. With it, the victor ensures greater … motives for conflict. When only victory or defeat is informative, the less scary party may attack to show that they are … tougher than expected. If the occurrence of conflict also conveys information, the scarier party is more likely to attack. By …

observe surprisingly high levels of within - group cooperation in conflict situations such as civil wars. We provide an … future security. We argue that a group's reputation is a public good with a natural weakest - link structure. We extend the …