Showing 1 - 10 of 2,465
We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176463
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014578010
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a … complex bundle of Conflict Management Procedures (CMPs). Through comparative statics, different scenarios are studied. A …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734516
This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept … of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling/ Nozic/Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199910
This paper analyzes a model in which two groups compete with each other for a prize in every time period. We assume that there is a status quo bias: Yesterday's winner is in a stronger position than the other group, if there is a fight today. Hence, a change of the status quo has long term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063789
players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields …-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012603859
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309020
internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non …-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance … more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291510
internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non …-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance … more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198485
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600632