asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of …We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict influences its chance of …We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that … conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that …

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the … framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by … to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally …

The Hirshleifer model of conflict is used to argue that without voluntary action to increase human security, the state … may have extensive opportunities and incentives to increase the risk of conflict in the many poor countries where central … in the ‘likelihood of conflict' sea. That energy, which is harmless and even potentially useful, can become dangerous …

collective action in the context of finitely repeated intergroup conflict and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are …