We provide an explanation for a frequently observed vertical restraint in ecommerce, namely that brand manufacturers partially or completely prohibit that retailers distribute their high-quality products over the internet. Our analysis is based on the assumption that a consumer's purchasing...

This paper analyzes a market in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete by setting menus of two-part tariffs, and in which some consumers are not informed about the linear per-unit price component. We consider two regulatory interventions that limit firms’ ability to price...

We provide an explanation for a frequently observed vertical restraint in ecommerce, namely that brand manufacturers partially or completely prohibit that retailers distribute their high-quality products over the internet. Our analysis is based on the assumption that a consumer's purchasing...

This paper analyzes a market in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete by setting menus of two-part tariffs, and in which some consumers are not informed about the linear per-unit price component. We consider two regulatory interventions that limit firms’ ability to price...

We analyze competing strategic platforms setting fees to a local monopolist merchant and granting cash-back rebates to end users, when the merchant is prevented from surcharging platforms customers, as frequently occurs with credit cards. Each platform has an incentive to gain transactions by...

We experimentally investigate purchase decisions with linear and nonlinear pricing under risk. The experiment is based on a single period stochastic inventory problem with endogenous cost. It extends classic binary lottery experiments to test standard decision theoretic predictions concerning...

Analyzing a sequential bargaining framework with one retailer and two suppliers of substitutable goods, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism when consumer shopping costs are taken into account. If consumers economize on their shopping costs by bundling...

Neil Averitt and Robert Lande have for some time been writing about consumer choice as a new paradigm for antitrust. In this comment, I both praise and extend the consumer choice paradigm and provide concrete examples of both cutting edge and familiar antitrust issues where consumer choice can...

Analyzing a sequential bargaining framework with one retailer and two suppliers of substitutable goods, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism when consumer shopping costs are taken into account. If consumers economize on their shopping costs by bundling...

We discuss the current structure of card networks that facilitate transactions between merchants and consumers. We find that presently fees for this intermediation are considerably higher than costs. This is facilitated by rules imposed by the card networks on the merchants that do not allow...