endogenous and they depend on prices, acting as a coordination device among consumers. The model is able to account for …

. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of … information revealed, we analyze how his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the … information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but …

. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of … information revealed, we analyse how his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the … information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but …

. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of … information revealed, we analyze how his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the … information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but …

's incentives to extract information rent. By reducing the costs of information acquisition or forcing firms to supply consumers … with the respective information about past usage, policy can further improve welfare, as contracts become more efficient …

efficient purchasing decisions (given their private information), and in the second step the monopoly extracts the surplus from …

I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multi … from accurate recommendations, the seller may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the seller prefers to … commit to not use information for pricing in order to encourage information disclosure. However, this commitment hurts the …