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In Buy-It-Now (BIN, hereafter) auctions, sellers can make a "take-it-or-leave-it" price offer (BIN price) prior to an auction. We analyse experimentally how eBay sellers set BIN prices and whether they benefit from offering them. Using the real eBay environment in the laboratory, we find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902715
We investigate experimentally on eBay how sellers set prices in "Buy-It-Now" (BIN) auctions. We find that the eBay format leads to prices substantially below those expected in second-price auctions. Moreover, our results reveal that the information available on eBay about buyer experience and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309640
We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a … feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize … the experiment. Our model includes Bayesian persuasion as the special case in which every experiment is feasible; however …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215572
Internet auctions have become very important for B-2-C E-Commerce. With 56 million active users, eBay alone generates a 34 billion in turnover per annum [Ebay05, 2]. Typically, forward auctions with an ascending- bid mechanism are employed in B-2-C or C-2-C environments. Sellers initiate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210354
It is common for auctions to feature reserve prices that are kept secret. In auctions with independent private values, there is no clear theoretical explanation for why the reserve price should be disclosed publicly or kept secret. Therefore, we conducted laboratory experiments to investigate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351059
We present a model of persuasive signalling, where a privately-informed sender selects from a class of signals with different precision to persuade a receiver to take one of two actions. The sender's information could be either favourable or unfavourable. The receiver observes both the sender's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038885
We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesianpersuasion. In particular, we ask whether more noise (a la Blackwell) is always harmful forthe information designer, i.e., the sender. We show that in general this is not the case. Weprovide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854480
On whom do food safety announcements have the least impact? Building on research on cognitive dissonance and confirmatory bias, this study shows that consumers tend to inadequately process (food safety) information, pay limited attention to signals, and make purchase decisions that are biased...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014133499
I study experimental markets in which sellers interact with buyers who have biased beliefs about the characteristics of the product that is being sold. I examine whether such buyers can be exploited by sellers through the use of specifically designed pricing structures, as suggested by recent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985334
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008935685