Showing 1 - 10 of 2,040
announcements is called a rating system. We show that, absent reputation effects, information censoring cannot improve attainable …, Mailath and Samuelson (2004), where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can … the seller's payoff. -- Reputations ; Rating Systems ; Online Reputation Mechanisms ; Disappearing Reputations ; Permanent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665736
I develop a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and a partially informed sender who is averse to lying. The sender's cost of lying is endogenous, depending on the receiver's beliefs induced by the sender's message, rather than on its exogenous formulation. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013062525
We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesianpersuasion. In particular, we ask whether more noise (a la Blackwell) is always harmful forthe information designer, i.e., the sender. We show that in general this is not the case. Weprovide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854480
Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956164
This paper studies dynamic price competition over two periods between two firms selling differentiated durable goods to two buyers who are privately informed about their types, but have valuations of the two goods dependent on the other buyer's type. The firms' pricing strategy in period 1 must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010381472
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456788
This paper studies the general information disclosure model (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981) relaxing the assumption of monotonicity in preferences. I apply the belief-based approach, which is developed in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) and applied to cheap talk (Lipnowski and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871383
Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011941691
In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the effective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009516790
We present a model of persuasive signalling, where a privately-informed sender selects from a class of signals with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038885