This paper studies the role of observational learning in search markets where buyers do not take the list price as a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Using a unique data from the Beijing housing market, we estimate a structural model in which buyers infer a seller’s reservation value from the...

This article questions the rather pessimistic conclusions of Allen and Carroll (2001) about the ability of consumer to learn the optimal buffer-stock based consumption rule. To this aim, we develop an agent based model where alternative learning schemes can be compared in terms of the...

When interacting with others, individuals are often known to adjust their behavior based on the gender characteristics of the other person. Information about another person’s gender tends to influence both behavior towards that individual, as well as expectations about that individual’s...

We model firms' quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently skeptical about undisclosed quality. We show that neither competition nor the presence of sophisticated consumers necessarily protect cursed consumers from being exploited....

This paper studies the general information disclosure model (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981) relaxing the assumption of monotonicity in preferences. I apply the belief-based approach, which is developed in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) and applied to cheap talk (Lipnowski and...

This paper analyzes in a spatial framework how much information a seller discloses about the variety he sells when he faces a buyer with a privately known taste for variety. I identify an equilibrium in which, for each possible variety, the seller's optimal strategy consists of either fully...

Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of information. This article analyzes why such rules are enacted. Specifically, 1) why wouldn't firms voluntarily disclose their private information; and 2) given that voluntary disclosure would not be forthcoming, who has the incentive to lobby for...

We study how joint delegation of production and disclosure choices alters the incentives that firm owners offer to their managers. Our first set of results shows how the incentive weights that owners place on revenues are affected by firm characteristics and by whether their manager chooses ex...

Information disclosure is important for the economic well-being of society. Furthermore, given various issues, such as disclosure related to corporate social responsibility and scientific communication between scientists and society, the state of information disclosure is closely related to...