characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this … claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "R&D Spillovers in Duopoly" …

large body of research demonstrates the power of “reciprocity” for inducing cooperation: When others know that you have … they think others are also cooperating; and people can develop habits of cooperation that shape their default inclinations …

externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected … graph. Because of the presence of externalities, the profitability of coalitional threats to an organization depend on the … externalities, while the fully connected organization emerges under negative. This result is shown to hold independently of the …

, the less likely cooperation will be. …

externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected … graph. Because of the presence of externalities, the profitability of coalitional threats to an organization depend on the … externalities, while the fully connected organization emerges under negative. This result is shown to hold independently of the …

externality. A within-subjects measure of reticence to impose harm does not explain cooperation. But the externality makes … participants more pessimistic. However conditional on their beliefs participants are more, not less cooperative if cooperation …

externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected … graph. Because of the presence of externalities, the profitability of coalitional threats to an organization depend on the … externalities, while the fully connected organization emerges under negative. This result is shown to hold independently of the …

competition (lottery contest) and one that encourages cooperation (public good game). We find that simultaneous participation in … strategic uncertainty and path-dependence across games. Our design allows us to compare preferences for cooperation and …