The article suggests a new explanation for cooperation in large, unstructured societies that avoids the restrictions … for cooperation to be part of an asymptotically stable equilibrium of an evolutionary dynamics of signaling norm … of the social norm and two parameters measuring the cost of cooperation into relation with each other. …

Economists have a long tradition in identifying the evolution of cooperation in large, unstructured societies as a … puzzle. We suggest a new explanation for cooperation which avoids restrictions of most previous attempts. Our explanation … deals with the role of internalized norms for cooperation in large unstructured populations. Even internalized norms, i …

cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs …-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a … laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of subjects play strategies that belong to the predicted equilibrium set …

cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs …-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a … laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of subjects play strategies that belong to the predicted equilibrium set …