We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...

This paper examines the role of other-regarding and time preferences for cooperation in the field. We study the preferences of fishermen whose main, and often only, source of income stems from using a common pool resource (CPR). The exploitation of a CPR involves a negative interpersonal and...

In a two-person ¯nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speci¯cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship...

It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of...

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism withone-way communication. The relevance of one person’s words is assessedby assigning exogeniously the role of the ‘communicator’ to onegroup member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange ofpromises is necessary for the...

A conditional cooperator in a public goods game wants to match hispartners' expected contribution. We investigate theoretically and empiricallywhether (and to what extent) conditional cooperation can explainhow individual contributions evolve in a repeated two-person public goodsexperiment using...

How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), ifpayment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is byitself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknoteand giving the agent the first...