This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal / agent model by a … project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority … consideration of e ort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if …

This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by … the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to … authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and agency problems emphasized in the literature …

conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We …

conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We …

may prefer to delegate authority over decisions to the risk-averse agent. Intuitively, for incentive reasons, the …