We ask why we observe multiple layers of decision-making in fund management with investors, sponsors, fund managers, and consultants, even if additional decision-makers are costly and do not contribute to superior performance. In our model, an investor hires a wealth manager (“sponsor”), who...

A recent theory by Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) proposes that trust is an important component for delegated investing. This paper tests the theory in a laboratory experiment. Participants first play a trust game. Participants then act as investors who have to make two separate,...

Since years, incentives for the management have become a standard upon acquisitions of companies by Private Equity Investors - so-called Buy-Outs. However, until this date there are no empirical studies available on the arrangements of management participations and potential conflicts of...

The tendency of humans to shy away from using algorithms - even when algorithms observably outperform their human counterpart - has been referred to as algorithm aversion. We conduct an experiment to test for algorithm aversion in financial decision making. Participants acting as investors can...

We study SPACs in a continuous-time delegated investment model. Our model is built upon three unique features of SPACs: the sponsor and the investor are only partially aligned, a SPAC has a short time horizon, and the investor has the final control over investment approval. Due to the...

We revisit the value implications of female representation on boards by exploiting the board diversity campaign announcement by Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM)—the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund. In February 2021, NBIM required its portfolio firms to have at least 30% female...

We analyze the effects of the observed increased share of delegated capital for trading strate-gies and equilibrium prices by introducing delegation into a standard Lucas exchange economy. In equilibrium, some investors trade on their own account, but others decide to delegate trading to...

This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...

Asset owners (principals) typically do not manage their own investments and leave this job to delegated managers (agents). What is best for the asset owner, however, is usually not best for the fund manager. Additional agency conflicts arise when the asset owner does not know the quality and...

We test theoretical predictions on when CEOs delegate authority to senior managers in mergers and acquisitions. Using a novel proxy for delegation, we find that CEOs are more likely to delegate when the firm is larger or more complex and are less likely to delegate when they have an...