This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative...

Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others'...

This paper considers two games, a stag hunt and a prisoners' dilemma. Each game features non-binding, costless, and free-form pre-play communication. I focus on players who verbally first suggest cooperation in each game. I study experimentally whether the frequency of verbal initiative-taking...

This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: We suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally...

In response to Wooders (2001), I review the contributions of Engl and Scotchmer (1996) regarding monotonicity and the hedonic core, show how our contributions diverge from those previously in the literature, and highlight the importance of our assumptions by giving counterexamples, particularly...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

The siting of noxious facilities is usually a reason for conflict: as a society we want them, but as individuals (and often as communities) we do not want them close by. Faced with this problem, economists have used several methods such as lotteries, auctions or insurance policies. However, all...

How should an organization be designed in order to provide its members with minimal incentives to defect? And how does the optimal design depend on the type of strategic interaction between defectors and remaining organizational members? This paper addresses such issues in a game theoretic model...

In response to Wooders (2001), I review the contributions of Engl and Scotchmer (1996) regarding monotonicity and the hedonic core, show how our contributions diverge from those previously in the literature, and highlight the importance of our assumptions by giving counterexamples, particularly...

The Shapley value is a well-known solution concept for TU games. The Maschler-Owen value and the NTU Shapley value are two well-known extensions of the TU Shapley value to NTU games. A hyperplane game is an NTU game such that the feasible set for each coalition is a hyperplane. On the domain of...