Allowing firms to cooperate in their R&D is an industrial policy which has received much attention in recent economics literature. Many of these contributions are based on the seminal analysis of d?Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988]. We provide a general version of their model which encompasses...

The paper provides a micro-founded differentiated duopoly illustration of a beauty contest, in which the relative weight put on the competition motive of the payoffs is not exogenous but may be manipulated by the players. The conflict between the competition and the fundamental motives, already...

The focus of this paper is on the consequences of asymmetric spillovers on the strategic investments in an oligopoly with leaders and followers. Both in the investment and output game, leaders move before the followers. Spillovers may occur between leaders and between followers and from leaders...

The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate...

A longstanding criticism of the core is that it is too sensitive to small changes in player numbers, as in a well known example where one extra seller (resp. buyer) causes the entire surplus to go to the buyer's (seller's) side. We test this example in the lab, using several different trading...

This note revisits the impossibility result by Watanabe and Muto (2008), showing that almost all coalition structures cannot be at the core of patent licensing games. In contrast to their result, we demonstrate that if we only allow devia- tions under the exogenously fixed payment scheme and...