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We propose a notion of core for school choice problems. We say that a coalition of students is able to enforce a subassignment among them if, given their priorities at schools, other students together cannot exclude any of them from her assignment. An assignment is in the core if no coalition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838118
For marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find … marriage markets by adding individual rationality and by replacing anonymity with gender fairness. We generalize both results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222181
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly … dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this … von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159464
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703024
existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
In the Nash Demand Game each of two players announces the share he demands of an amount of money that may be split between them. If the demands can be satisfied, they are; otherwise, neither player receives any money. This game has many pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This note characterizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062730
This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050
We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256