There is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation in cooperative games. Myerson (1979) introduced communication graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson...

Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose the class of α-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, which generalizes the Local Responsibility Sharing...

Given any α ∈ [0, 1], an α-constant-sum game on a finite set of players, N, is a function that assigns a real number to any coalition S ⊆ N, such that the sum of the worth of the coalition S and the worth of its complementary coalition N\S is α times of the worth of the grand coalition....

In view of the nature of pursuing profit, a selfish coefficient function is employed to describe the degrees of selfishness of players in different coalitions, which is the desired rate of return to the worth of coalitions. This function brings in the concept of individual expected reward to...