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We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers are known by all of them. Then two types of...
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A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every...
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buyers is known by all of them. Then two cooperative games, which we call the auction game and the ring game, corresponding … to such a market situation are considered. Auction games are related to special total big boss games, while ring games … auction game and the ring game arising from the same two-corner market situation. For both classes of games relevant solution …
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Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
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In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of … stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by … the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot …
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