Mentalising is assumed to be involved in decision-making that is necessary to social interaction. We investigated the relationship between mentalising and two types of strategic games - those involving the choice to cooperate with another for joint gain or compete for own gain and those...

In the Nash Demand Game each of two players announces the share he demands of an amount of money that may be split between them. If the demands can be satisfied, they are; otherwise, neither player receives any money. This game has many pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This note characterizes...

In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the...

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

Successful coordination is key for economic and societal wealth. The rich literature on the minimum-effort game (MEG) has provided valuable insights into coordination, both theoretically and empirically. Yet, although real-world scenarios often involve asymmetric benefits and/or costs from...

Revealing the identities of contributors has been shown to increase cooperation in public goods games. In this paper we experimentally investigate whether this finding holds true when decisions are made by groups rather than individuals. We distinguish between groups in which members can discuss...