We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfareand two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly differentcountry-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities inseven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous...

This paper revisits the move to the market hypothesis proposed by Malone et al. (1987) andargues that, although compatible with empirical results, the theoretical basis of this hypothesisis flawed since no clear distinction is made between coordination mechanisms and forms ofgovernance. Based on...

Though auctions show a prevailing dominance in electronic markets, our understanding of howauctions work on human behaviour is still rather limited. In this paper we analyse the impact ofemotional processes on the decision making of human agents in electronic auctions. The analysis isbased on a...

This lecture is a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideasare fleshed out in a book Natural Justice, which is itself a condensed versionof an earlier two-volume book Game Theory and the Social Contract (Binmore[14, 12, 13])...

Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...

Within the setting of two simple two-person coordinationgames the formation of subjective strategies is observed experimentally.Though the structure of the game is unknown playersuse their actions in order to coordinate on a specific equilibrium.Strategies enable them to interpret the...

Conventions can be narrowly interpreted as coordinated ways of equilibriumplay, i.e., a specific convention tells all players in a game withmultiple strict equilibria which equilibrium to play. In our view, coordinationoften takes place before learning about the games. Thus, one hasto coordinate...