The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur,...

This note reports part of a larger study of petty corruption by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of...

The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur,...

This note reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of...

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of quot;petty corruptionquot; by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of...

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of petty corruption by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic...