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The economics of corruption: an overview / George T. Abed and Sanjeev Gupta -- pt. 1. Causes and consequences of … corruption. Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope, and cures / Vito Tanzi -- Bureaucratic corruption and the … rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much? / Caroline Van Rijckeghem and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001715873
Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Contributors -- 1 The Economics of Corruption: An Overview George T …. Abed and Sanjeev Gupta -- Part I Causes and Consequences of Corruption -- 2 Corruption Around the World: Causes …, Consequences, Scope, and Cures Vito Tanzi -- 3 Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service …
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This volume presents 18 recent IMF research studies on the causes and consequences of corruption, as well as how it can … civil service wages affect corruption, the impact of natural resource availability on corruption, how corruption retards the … growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, the impact of corruption on a country’s income distribution and incidence of …
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This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result …, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the … citizens can indirectly benefit from corruption. The paper shows that, under this condition, if the citizens anticipate a shift …
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This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927572