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Delegation and rewards
Vetter, Stefan Wilhelm - 2012 - This version: 29 March 2012
between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field …We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more … pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571021
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Delegation and Rewards
Vetter, Stefan - 2012
between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field …We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more … pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333745
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Delegation and Rewards
Vetter, Stefan - 2012
between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field …We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more … pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427635
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You owe me
Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understand the gift giver’s intention. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590892
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Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption : an experiment
Vetter, Stefan - In: European journal of political economy 31 (2013), pp. 188-204
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229533
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You owe me
Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or informational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720587
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You owe me
Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or in-formational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685876
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You owe me
Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
backfire when available but not provided. -- gift exchange ; externalities ; lobbyism ; corruption ; reciprocity ; social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009683372
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You Owe Me
Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2021
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or informational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315834
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Corrupt reciprocity : an experiment
Lambsdorff, Johann; Frank, Björn - 2007
We let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of … negative reciprocity. -- Corruption ; ultimatum game ; whistleblowing ; gender ; signaling ; trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009425287