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Judicial independence is not only a necessary condition for the impartiality of judges, it can also endanger it: judges that are independent could have incentives to remain uninformed, become lazy or even corrupt. It is therefore often argued that judicial independence and judicial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263281
Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264138
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270593
In der letzten Zeit häuften sich auch in Deutschland Vorfälle, die in der Öffentlichkeit den Verdacht aufkommen lassen, es sei Korruption involviert. Dass Korruption in Deutschland zum Normalfall wird, lässt sich zwar nach Ansicht von Prof. Dr. Christian Watrin, Universität zu Köln, nicht...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691892
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Dieser Beitrag setzt sich mit dem Verhältnis von Schattenwirtschaft und Korruptionauseinander. Es wird insbesondere die Frage untersucht, welche Rolle die Schattenwirtschaftin korrupten Ökonomien spielt. Die Schattenwirtschaft begrenzt letztendlich dieMacht korrupter Institutionen, indem sie...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312111
We study the effect of fair institutions on growth. In our model, individuals are endowed with unequal entitlements to theeconomy’s output. They can free-ride or cooperate. Cooperation is individually costly, but increases aggregate output and growth.Experimentally, we observe significantly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866839
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003864431
Legal provisions that protect politicians from arrest and prosecution exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why, and with what effects, do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199710