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Cartels and bribes
Burguet, Roberto; Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2021
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697250
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
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Delegation and Rewards
Vetter, Stefan - 2012
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333745
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Delegation and Rewards
Vetter, Stefan - 2012
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427635
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Delegation and rewards
Vetter, Stefan Wilhelm - 2012 - This version: 29 March 2012
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571021
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Delegation and rewards
Vetter, Stefan - 2012
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009526172
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Bid rigging and entry deterrence in public procurement : evidence from an investigation into collusion and corruption in Quebec
Clark, Robert; Coviello, Decio; Gauthier, Jean-Francois; … - 2018
We study the impact of an investigation into collusion and corruption to learn about the organization of cartels in … investigation in Montreal and in Quebec City, where there have been no allegations of collusion or corruption. We find that entry …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011809425
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Study on the collusive corruption in supervision of bank credit
Nan, Xu-guang; Kao, Meng-chun - In: Journal of applied finance & banking 2 (2012) 1, pp. 93-103
Commercial banks are typical hierarchical organizations, in which the multipleprincipal-agent problem exists and induces serious internal collusive corruption. This article analyzes the collusive corruption between credit supervisors and credit managers in bank credit activities, through three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009539826
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Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018 - This version: June 5, 2018
show that the introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle decreases the collusion and bribe acceptance rate, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011861538
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Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018 - This version: May, 2018
show that the introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle decreases the collusion and bribe acceptance rate, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011894106