Showing 1 - 10 of 494
We conduct an experiment to analyze the conditions under which individuals' propensity to engage in bribery and tolerance towards corrupt actors differ across gender. We manipulate the key bribery dimensions — the benefits to corrupt actors and the negative externality caused to other people....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833981
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291803
For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301733
For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008654377
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567098
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the risk attitude of the participant failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089808
The paper studies the relative effectiveness of extrinsic monetary disincentives and intrinsic non-monetary disincentives to corruption. In doing so, we also test the Beckarian prediction that at the same level of expected payoff, a low probability of detection with high penalty is a stronger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960284
We consider a two-layered review system of environmental regulation where a polluting firm periodically self-reports its emissions to a regulatory authority. The system typically requires a third party to verify the firm's report and, in addition, an official of the regulatory authority to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012858816
We study the relative effectiveness of extrinsic monetary disincentives and intrinsic non-monetary disincentives to corruption, using a harassment bribery game. In doing so, we also test the Beckerian prediction that at the same level of expected payoff, a low probability of detection with high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931515
The paper studies the relative effectiveness of extrinsic monetary disincentives and intrinsic non-monetary disincentives to corruption. In doing so, we also test the Beckarian prediction that at the same level of expected payoff, a low probability of detection with high penalty is a stronger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625352