This article describes the anatomy of health insurance. It begins by considering the optimal design of health insurance policies. Such policies must make tradeoffs appropriately between risk sharing on the one hand and agency problems such as moral hazard (the incentive of people to seek more...

This chapter reviews the theory and empirical literature on physician market power, behavior, and motives, referred to collectively as the issue of physician agency. The chapter is organized around an increasingly complex view of the demand conditions facing a physician, beginning with the most...

This chapter summarizes the many aspects of public policy for health care. I first consider government policy affecting individual behaviors. Government intervention to change individual actions such as smoking and drinking is frequently justified on externality grounds. External costs of...

This chapter reviews topics related to the demand for health insurance, including the question of how choice of health insurance should be structured for consumers. After the first section summarizes some of the institutional features of health insurance in high- and middle-income countries, a...