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Financial Covenants and Fire Sales : Fractures in the Leveraged Loan Market
Kundu, Shohini - 2020
about the role of CLOs in the provision of credit to risky firms. Managers are not passive buy and hold investors, unlike … their CDO counterparts. There is selection, monitoring and churn. The trading behavior of managers with respect to loans … exhibits stark differences in returns between capital-constrained and unconstrained managers -- unconstrained managers do not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834756
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Analysis of Credit Culture in the Zimbabwean Banking Sector
Bonga, Wellington Garikai - 2019
determine the level of credit culture employed in the banking sector. Using 188 responses from an electronic survey comprising …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012872235
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Banks as Lenders and Shareholders : Evidence from Japan
Gao, Wenlian - 2010
This paper examines the effects of the main bank's equity-debt structure, (i.e., equity stakes and debt claims) on firm performance and financial policies in Japan over the period 1977-1987. Results show that firms with main bank equity stakes have lower performance than those without. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136505
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Bank Loan Loss Provisions Research : A Review
Ozili, Peterson K - 2017
We review the recent academic and policy literature on bank loan loss provisioning (LLP) to identify several advances in the literature, to highlight some challenges in LLP research and suggest possible directions for future research with some concluding remarks. Among other things, we observe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964664
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Paying Bank Risk Professionals to Lie about Bank Loan Loss Provisioning Process
Ozili, Peterson K - 2019
. While it is not difficult for bank managers and analysts to understand that the provisioning process is subject to gaming …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902590
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Politically Conservative CEOs and Bank Loan Contracting
Francis, Bill B. - 2012
Financial contracts are strongly influenced by the perception that transacting parties have of each other. Hence, if contracting counterparties such as banks perceive that there is a difference in the likelihood that CEOs with conservative and liberal political orientation will discharge their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106018
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Overlapping Board Connections with Banker Directors and Corporate Loan Terms : Evidence from Syndicated Loans
Eğrican, Aslı Togan - 2020
I look at the relationship between corporate loan terms and connections of board members to bankers through employment on other boards, a connection less likely to be affected by confounding factors. Specifically, I examine whether loan terms such as pricing and maturity as well as other loan...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012844268
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The Dark Side of Bank CEO Risk-taking Incentives : Evidence from Bank Lending Decisions
Ho, Po-Hsin - 2019
This paper investigates how bank CEO risk-taking incentives influence bank lending decisions. Consistent with the existing CEO incentive literature, we find that CEOs with higher risk-taking incentives (vega) tend to relax their lending standards in bank loan contracts to pursue higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012867107
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CEO Incentives, Relationship Lending and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing
Chen, Liqiang - 2016
This paper investigates how lending relationships attenuate the conflict of interest between creditors and shareholders that arises from CEO compensation contracts. We find that lending relationships mitigate the influence of CEO risk-taking incentives on loan spreads, especially for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005200
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CEO Overconfidence and Financial Crisis : Evidence from Bank Lending and Leverage
Ho, Po-Hsin - 2015
Over a period that includes the 1998 Russian crisis and 2007-2009 financial crisis, banks with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) were more likely to weaken lending standards and increase leverage than other banks in advance of a crisis, making them more vulnerable to the shock of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016035