Using a sample of bank loans, we study how financial contracts are different when there are conflicts of interest not only between the contracting parties but within one of the contracting parties. Such conflicts can arise in lending syndicates when, for instance, the lead arranger has the...

We study the role of covenants in syndicated bank loans. We argue that, in addition to being a device for monitoring the borrower, covenants can help mitigate conflicts of interest between the lead arranger and participating banks in the syndicate. Such disagreements can arise when, for...

We study the role of covenants in syndicated bank loans. We argue that, in addition to being a device for monitoring the borrower, covenants can help mitigate conflicts of interest between the lead-arranger and participating banks in the syndicate. Such disagreements can arise when, for...

Is bank financing compatible with innovation? We show that an exogenous enhancement in value of borrowers' patents, either through greater patent protection or creditor rights over collateral, results in cheaper loans. Using regression discontinuity design, we show while R\&D investment drops...

We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large-scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the...