Firms with greater shareholder rights have higher risk-shifting incentives. Such firms should have more concentrated loan syndicates to ensure more intensive monitoring. In the United States, the second generation antitakeover laws reduced the shareholder rights significantly. We find that loan...

We show that executive ownership is a significant driver of the demand for credit following credit expansion policies. Our focus on credit demand is in contrast to most studies that have focused on credit supply factors such as bank-capital. Our identification exploits the large and unexpected...

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for both endogenous compensation and leverage fully rationalizes...

We examine the effect of relationship lending on a firm’s cash-holding levels. Relationship lending allows lenders to generate private information about borrowers which mitigates their financial constraints. We find that cash-holding levels for firms with a relationship lender are...

We examine the effect of relationship lending on a firm's cash-holding levels. Relationship lending allows lenders to generate private information about borrowers which mitigates their financial constraints. We find that cash-holding levels for firms with a relationship lender are significantly...