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Why do borrowers pledge collateral? : New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information
Berger, Allen N.; Espinosa-Vega, Marco A.; Frame, W. Scott - 2007 - Rev.
An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selection, credit … incidence of collateral. We exploit exogenous variation in lender information related to the adoption of an information … technology that reduces ex ante private information, and compare collateral outcomes before and after adoption. Our results are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730563
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Bank lending, geographical distance, and credit risk : an empirical assessment of the Church Tower Principle
Carling, Kenneth; Lundberg, Sofia - 2002
Does the Church Tower Principle, i.e. geographical proximity between borrowing firm and lending bank, matter in credit risk management? If so, the bank might expose itself to a greater risk by lending to distant firms and should therefore respond by rationing them harder. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011585141
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Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information
Berger, Allen N.; Espinosa-Vega, Marco A.; Frame, W. Scott - 2007
An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selection, credit … incidence of collateral. We exploit exogenous variation in lender information related to the adoption of an information … technology that reduces ex ante private information, and compare collateral outcomes before and after adoption. Our results are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292292
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Credit rationing effects of credit value-at-risk
Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David Jan Cornelis; … - 2004
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334832
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Psychometrics as a tool to improve screening and access to credit
Arráiz, Irani; Bruhn, Miriam; Stucchi, Rodolfo - 2015
psychometric test can lower the risk of the loan portfolio when used as a secondary screening mechanism for already banked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485359
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The role of credit rationing and collateral in debt financing
Houben, Eike; Nippel, Peter - 2001
Credit rationing and the use of collateral are widely observed in debt financing. To our view there is yet no … collateral is limited. In our model we show that credit rationing and the use of collateral are always necessary for debt … resulting from the information asymmetry. Furthermore, we extend the set of possible collateral to property rights over physical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011281514
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On the existence of credit rationing and screening with loan size in competitive markets with imperfect information
Kraus, Daniel - 2013 - This version: September 10, 2013
Although credit rationing has been a stylized fact since the groundbreaking papers by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, hereinafter S-W) and Besanko and Thakor (1987a, hereinafter B-T), Arnold and Riley (2009) note that credit rationing is unlikely in the S-W model, and Clemenz (1993) shows that it does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009790502
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Consumer Credit : Too Much or Too Little (or Just Right)?
Zinman, Jonathan - 2013
The intersection of research and policy on consumer credit often has a Goldilocks feel. Some researchers and policymakers posit that consumer credit markets produce too much credit. Other researchers and policymakers posit that markets produce too little credit. I review theories and evidence on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072659
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Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk
Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; de Vries, … - 2004
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325499
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When do we have borrower or credit volume rationing in competitive credit market with imperfect information?
Kraus, Daniel - 2010
This paper examines the conditions for credit volume or borrower rationing in a competitive credit market in which the project characteristics are private information of the borrowers. There can only be credit volume rationing if the higher-risk credit applicants have a higher return in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319299