anticipation of this bailout undermines a bank's private incentive to impose a bail-in. In the resulting equilibrium, bail-ins are …We study the interaction between a government's bailout policy and banks' willingness to impose losses on (or \bail in …

This paper tests whether poorly capitalized banks with troubled loan books are more likely to miss their bailout … non-cumulative preferred stock are also more likely to be TARP deadbeats. In addition, banks that missed a bailout … dividend in the prior quarter are significantly more likely to miss the next bailout dividend …

system; any preset resolution system will be abandoned for a bailout if it would produce socially unacceptable loss … done ad hoc through Congress or should bailout authority be institutionalized in an agency? And second, should creditors of … bailed out firms be forced to accept less than full payment (or take a “haircut”) as part of the bailout? Ensuring …

having a central bank or a separate agency responsible for microprudential banking supervision, the advantages of having this … a single supervisor, be it the central bank or an agency, has in fact lower costs than capturing two. Nevertheless …

We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting bailouts may signal firms' financial troubles and worsen … subsequent financing conditions. Bailout stigma can lead to low or even no take-up of otherwise attractive bailout offers, the … improving their subsequent funding conditions. Secret bailouts may not eliminate bailout stigma, but secrecy accompanied by …