affiliates with peer monitoring incentives. Hence, MGI willingness to post collateral signals firms credit-worthiness to banks …

better at screening and monitoring opaque borrowers than banks are. Thus, banks benefit from the willingness of MGIs to post …

consistent with the view that MGIs are better than banks at screening and monitoring opaque borrowers. Thus, banks benefit from …

We study theoretically and empirically the demand for microcredit under different liability arrangements and risk … environments. A theoretical model shows that the demand for joint-liability loans can exceed that for individual-liability loans … when risk-averse borrowers value their long-term relationship with the lender. Joint liability then offers a way to …

firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the … benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of efforts … less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase monitoring costs …

determines borrower quality, loan terms, access to credit and bank monitoring of business term loans. Using a differences … credit by their bank. The reduction in collateral value also precedes a decrease in bank monitoring intensity and frequency …

almost exclusively attributable the credit officers. In conclusion, this paper confirms that, despite monitoring, the credit …