We study whether firms spread out debt maturity dates, which we call "granularity of corporate debt.'' In our model, firms that are unable to roll over expiring debt need to liquidate assets. If multiple small asset sales are less inefficient than a single large one, it can be optimal to...

The empirical tests of traditional structural models of credit risk tend to indicate that such models have been unsuccessful in the modeling of credit spreads. To address these negative findings some authors introduce single-factor stochastic volatility specifications and/or jumps.In the yield...

We study to what extent firms spread out their debt maturity dates across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt." We consider the role of debt granularity using a simple model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or...

Advocates for internal model-based capital regulation argue that this approach will reduce costs and remove distortions that are created by rules-based capital regulations. These claims are examined using a Merton-style model of deposit insurance. Analysis shows that internal model-based capital...

We analyze the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) trading on firm investment, long-term debt financing, and valuation. In our model, the firm is endowed with a real option to initiate a project and enhance its future growth. Its creditors have access to CDS contracts that hedge them against...

Executive compensation is designed to create incentives for CEOs to act in the best interest of shareholders. Short-term (bonus) and equity-based incentives induce risk taking behaviors of the CEO that could further change a firm's risk exposure. This article examines the linkage between...

This paper introduces a measure that captures the premium in bond prices that is due to the value of creditor control. We estimate the premium as the difference in the bond price and an equivalent synthetic bond without control rights that is constructed using CDS contracts. Empirically, we find...