We provide the first empirical analysis on the effects of credit default swaps (CDS) on corporate distress resolution with a focus on debt recovery rate. CDS contracts are settled shortly after the occurrence of credit events such as restructuring or bankruptcy filings and, presumably, should...

We examine the impact on a firm when it is exogenously forced to switch its bank relationship from one branch to another branch of the same bank. We show the effect depends directly on the relative balance between the hard accounting information provided to the bank by the firm, as part of the...

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk-taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk-taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of...

Credit default swaps (CDS) introduce frictions in debt renegotiations because they alter the incentives of creditors insured with CDS to favor bankruptcy instead of restructuring debt out-of-court. Such renegotiation frictions can increase bond spreads by increasing distress resolution costs....

In this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder governance mechanisms on the firms' credit risk through credit default swap spreads. Our results suggest that higher antitakeover provisions decrease the price of debt. We find that on average, addition of one antitakeover provision lowers the...

Korean Abstract: 이 논문에서는 차주별 패널자료를 이용하여 주택담보대출의 연체율변화를 금리요인과 리스크요인으로 구분하여 살펴보았다. 본고는 이를 실증적으로 규명하기 위하여 한국은행이 보유하고 있는 차주별 대출...

This paper investigates whether overleverage identifies companies' strategic default incentives. The results show that overlevered firms have lower equity beta than their counterparts. The strategic default option becomes more valuable when the firms are overlevered. Firms are more likely to be...

There is a curvilinear relation between credit ratings and acquisitions. Non-investment grade firms make more acquisitions as their ratings improve, consistent with the relaxation of financial constraints. However, this pattern reverses for investment grade firms, supporting the view that such...

Previous studies document that lenders lack incentives to monitor borrowing firms or to make concessions during bankruptcy if these lenders insure against corporate default with credit default swaps (CDS). This article investigates whether external auditors increase their audit fees for those...

We find that co-opted boards facilitate more erratic and arbitrary decision-making, contributing towards default risk. A one standard deviation increase in co-option increases default risk by 11% relative to normal levels. Supporting the notion that co-option makes decision-making more erratic,...