On 3 December EY hosted a SUERF conference on banking reform with Sir Howard Davies, the Chairman of RBS, and Dame Colette Bowe, the Chairman of the Banking Standards Board, as the two keynote speakers. Professor David Miles (Imperial College) gave the SUERF 2015 Annual Lecture on Capital and...

This paper examines capital adequacy regulation in Germany. After a short overview about financial regulation in Germany in general, the paper focuses on the most important development in the area of capital adequacy regulation from the 1930s up to the financial crisis. Two main trends are...

The United States is now committed to using two relatively sophisticated approaches to measuring capital adequacy: Basel III and stress tests. This paper shows how stress testing could mitigate weaknesses in the way Basel III measures credit and interest rate risk, the way it measures bank...

We present a stochastic simulation forecasting model for stress testing that is aimed at assessing banks’ capital adequacy, financial fragility, and probability of default. The paper provides a theoretical presentation of the methodology and the essential features of the forecasting model on...

On 3 December EY hosted a SUERF conference on banking reform with Sir Howard Davies, the Chairman of RBS, and Dame Colette Bowe, the Chairman of the Banking Standards Board, as the two keynote speakers. Professor David Miles (Imperial College) gave the SUERF 2015 Annual Lecture on Capital and...

The determinants of default risk of banks in emerging economies have so far received inadequate attention in the literature. This paper seeks to study the determinants of bank asset quality and profitability using panel data techniques and robust data sets for the period between 1997 and 2009....

Over the term of a securitization transaction, the concept of non-compliance allows a securitizing bank to classify a securitized loan as materially non-compliant with certain transaction requirements. Such a loan becomes unqualified for loss allocation. Therefore, non-compliant loans can...

We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks' sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one-time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following...

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995-2009...

We examine the effectiveness of bank regulation in the light of creditor diversity. Our theory suggests a bank can increase its value by matching the riskiness of its securities and the risk tolerance of its diverse creditors. Even a well-capitalized bank might not eliminate financial fragility...