We examine the relationship between corporate governance and default risk for a sample of firms cited in the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Using hazard analysis of actual default incidence and OLS regressions of a continuous...

Traditional methods for evaluating corporate credit risk rarely consider the impact of the macro economy on corporate value and performance. We argue that lenders and management can obtain valuable information about the need for and approach to restructuring by decomposing default predictions...

Creditors are increasingly transferring debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. We use the market for credit default swaps (CDSs) as a laboratory to show that such debt decoupling causes large adverse effects on firms whose shareholders have high...

Credit derivatives give creditors the possibility to transfer debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. We use the market for credit default swaps (CDSs) as a laboratory to show that the real effects of such debt unbundling crucially hinge on shareholder...

Credit derivatives give creditors the possibility to transfer debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. We use the market for credit default swaps (CDSs) as a laboratory to show that the real effects of such debt unbundling crucially hinge on shareholder...

We examine the relation between accounting conservatism and creditor recovery rates for firms in default. We also test the link between conservatism and the length of distress resolution proceedings. We find creditors of firms with more conservative accounting prior to default have significantly...

We investigate the takeover strategies of high default risk acquirers and their value impact. We find that these bidders select bigger, less profitable and unrelated targets, pursue transactions during recessions, and pay with shares by offering target shareholders high premiums. Their long-term...

Credit default swaps (CDS) introduce frictions in debt renegotiations because they alter the incentives of creditors insured with CDS to favor bankruptcy instead of restructuring debt out-of-court. Such renegotiation frictions can increase bond spreads by increasing distress resolution costs....

We provide the first empirical analysis on the effects of credit default swaps (CDS) on corporate distress resolution with a focus on debt recovery rate. CDS contracts are settled shortly after the occurrence of credit events such as restructuring or bankruptcy filings and, presumably, should...