We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders about the nature of output shocks. In such an environment, default creates a pessimistic outlook about the borrower's output...

We re-assess the view that sovereigns with a history of default are charged only a small and/or short-lived premium on the interest rate warranted by observed fundamentals. Our reassessment uses a metric of such a 'default premium' (DP) that is consistent with asymmetric information models and...

We show that cross-country differences in the underlying volatility and persistence of macroeconomic shocks help explain two historical regularities in sovereign borrowing: the existence of quot;viciousquot; circles of borrowing-and-default (quot;default trapsquot;), as well as the fact that...

A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debt-to-income ratios systematically face higher spreads and more stringent borrowing constraints than others with far higher debt ratios. Earlier research has rationalized the phenomenon in terms of sovereign...

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks. In such an environment, default signals the borrower's vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook. This...

We show that cross-country differences in the underlying volatility and persistence of macroeconomic shocks help explain two historical regularities in sovereign borrowing: the existence of ""vicious"" circles of borrowing-and-default (""default traps""), as well as the fact that recalcitrant...