Showing 331 - 338 of 338
This paper discusses the economic approach to deterring foreign exchange violations in the context of law enforcement in Madagascar. In order to find an optimal level of monetary sanction, the setting of the fine rate applied is based on one or more well-defined criteria such as the seriousness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014517156
This paper gives an overview about the legal background and the practice of the Hungarian Competition Authority as regards imposing monetary sanctions for misleading advertising and other types of unfair commercial practices. The sometimes unpredictable fluctuation of the level of fines is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028979
We analyze whether exposure to an SEC insider trading enforcement action affects how insiders trade. We find that following an insider trading enforcement action at one firm, exposed insiders earn significantly lower abnormal profits from their trades at other firms compared to non-exposed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227351
Corporate compliance programs have become increasingly criminalized. In the truest of ironies, companies have adopted compliance protocols that are motivated by and mimic application of the law they seek to avoid most. This approach to compliance — using the precepts of criminal enforcement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013228962
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012586116
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012205972
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419507