The present paper analyzes the interaction between the economic review of the probition of abuses of a dominant position (Article 82 EC) on the one hand and the efforts to enhance private enforcement of competition law through private damage claims on the other hand. The paper argues that...

This is one of the first articles to demonstrate that the primary goal of antitrust is neither exclusively to enhance economic efficiency, nor to address any social or political factor. Rather, the overriding intent behind the merger laws was to prevent prices to purchasers from rising due to...

We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation...

The enforcement policy of the Egyptian Competition Law reveals that there are two varying approaches in relation to the concept of related parties/single economic unit. The first requires for parties to be related, to be active in the same relevant market. This created discrepancies in practice....

This chapter discusses the significance of corporate compliance programmes as a competition enforcement tool. Current enforcement challenges in the fight against collusive practices that are, a low probability of detection and under-deterrence of corporate fines, raise the need to move away from...

This chapter describes the status quo of criminal enforcement in selected Member States of the European Union and discusses the desirability of criminal enforcement of competition law from a policy perspective. It concludes that at least in Germany the introduction of a criminal offence for...

Consumers suffer from high drug prices, which stem in large part from pharmaceutical companies’ anticompetitive games. This essay discusses the crucial role antitrust enforcement agencies can play in addressing pay-for-delay settlements and product hopping and draws lessons from this...

Common ownership fundamentally upsets the well-settled merger enforcement ecosystem. Not only it challenges basic principles informing merger policy such as the presumed profitability of mergers for the merging firms and the merger-specificity of potential efficiencies but also it works against...

The importance of economics to the analysis and enforcement of competition policy and law has increased tremendously in the developed market economies in the past forty years. In younger and developing market economies, competition law itself has a history of twenty to twenty-five years at most...

Antitrust enforcement in technology industries can be challenging: historical market information may have limited relevance, market shares may be unstable, and new entrants can be highly disruptive. Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have acknowledged the rigors of...