coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river …We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …

coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river …We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …

Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and …

Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and …

theory in river basin management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic … Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and …

coalitions of individuals that share a communal claim to that good. Generally, each legal coalition may use exclusionary rules to … legal coalition's endowment. We then ask: what types of CPR regimes are socially stable in the sense of having a nonempty … sense. We emphasize two cases of particular interest. (I) Unanimity. Unanimity is required for a legal coalition to …