I contribute to the theory of entangled political economy by showing how entanglement can be characterized in terms of political property rights. A political property right grants its holder a share of decision-making power in a specific context, as well as specifies to whom the costs and...

I present a theory of political property rights that serves as a complement to familiar Tiebout mechanisms in explaining governance outcomes. I argue that when the structure of political property rights is such that the polity most closely resembles a business corporation, governance will be...

This paper identifies political property rights and jurisdictional rivalry as the fundamental dimensions to understand comparative economic and political development. After developing a general framework for the study of relative performance in the ‘market for governance', we argue that...

I develop a positive theory of sovereignty that is rooted in political exchange. The key concept I use to characterize sovereignty is self-enforcing exchange of political rights. I conclude that a sovereign is an individual or body party to political exchange that does not rest on third-party...